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THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
DOCTRINE IN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
CONVEYANCES: POLICY-BACKED CHANGE
PROPOSALS
Washington's implied warranty of habitability doctrine is a creature of
public policy. Its application is appropriately defined and limited by policy
concerns. In conceivable cases, however, limits on the doctrine's application would yield results inconsistent with its public policy bases. Although
created to protect a specific class of residence purchasers, in Washington
the doctrine arbitrarily excludes from its coverage some potential members
of that class. Because of these and other problems, the doctrine needs
restructuring. This Comment explores the doctrine's public policy roots, 1
analyzes potential new elements and the doctrine's existing elements in
light of policy concerns, and suggests changes based on those concerns. 2
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY DOCTRINE

A.

From Buyer Beware to Builder Beware: A HistoricalPerspective

The caveat emptor doctrine has long been mostly inapplicable to sales
of personal property. Until recently, however, it applied to all conveyances
of real property. 3 Purchasers subject to caveat emptor take property at
their own risk. Upon discovering physical defects, such purchasers are
unable to maintain actions against vendors in the absence of specific
warranties or fraud. 4 While the bases for caveat emptor in English law are
somewhat unclear, American jurisdictions uniformly applied it to sales of
both personal and real property after the Revolution. 5 Courts today commonly posit that caveat emptor is premised on vendors and purchasers of
comparable bargaining power, skill, and experience engaging in arm's
length transactions. 6 Purchasers in the caveat emptor environment
1. See infra notes 26-46.
2. See infra notes 47-118. This Comment is limited in scope to a discussion of the implied warranty
of habitability doctrine as a theory of recovery in cases where defects have caused economic damage to
purchasers of defective structures. It does not concern defect-related personal injuries or damage to
property other than the structures themselves.
3. Bearman, CaveatEmptor in Sales of Realty-RecentAssaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV.
541, 542 (1961).
4. Id.
5. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim CaveatEmptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1178-81 (1931).
6. See, e.g., Frickel v. Surmyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d714, 719,725 P.2d 422,425 (1986); Tavares
v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo. 1975); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635,525 P.2d 1019, 1022

(1974).
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theoretically are aware of the risks they assume and can protect them7
selves accordingly.
With the advent of mass production and consumption of goods, caveat
emptor for sales of goods largely disappeared. 8 Consumers became accustomed to buying goods with implied warranties of merchantability and,
when applicable, of fitness for particular purposes. Following World War
II, the demand for and construction of houses exploded. 9 Instances of poor
quality almost inevitably resulted due to hurried construction and skimping
on materials. ' 0 Unsophisticated purchasers streamed into the courts seeking relief. 11 Accustomed to implied warranties for consumer goods, consumers "logically" expected the law to protect them when they purchased
new homes. 12 Consumers faced disappointment, however, as caveat emptor
still controlled all conveyances of realty. 13
Faced with a flood of relief-seeking purchasers, courts tried to do justice
by circumventing caveat emptor rather than by squarely abandoning it. 14
Over time, courts in most states adopted the implied warranty of habitability doctrine, deciding that in some circumstances an exception should
apply to the general caveat emptor rule. 15
B.

The Implied Warranty of Habitabilityin Washington

In House v. Thornton, the Washington Supreme Court adopted the
implied warranty of habitability doctrine. 16 The court recently addressed
7. The rule was said to be "best calculated to excite that caution and attention which all prudent
men ought to observe in making their contracts." Hamilton, supra note 5, at 1180.
8. Bearman, supra note 3, at 542.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 541.
13. Id. at 542.
14. Id. at 542-43. Courts circumvented caveat emptor by using theories such as implied warranty,
express warranty, warranty of marketable title, fraud, and negligence. See also Dixon v. Mountain City
Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. 1982) (listing various circumventing theories).
In Hoye v. Century Builders, 52 Wn. 2d 830, 833-35, 329 P.2d 474, 476-77 (1958), the court held
that a house sold during the course of erection was subject to an implied warranty that the completed
house would be fit for human habitation. The court in Hoye applied existing contract principles, holding
that liability under construction contracts could arise for failure of substantial performance. 52 Wn. 2d
at 835, 329 P.2d at 477. In Fain v. Nelson, 57 Wn. 2d 217, 222, 356 P.2d 302, 306 (1960), the court
limited the Hoye rule to houses sold during the course of erection. Caveat emptor still applied to all other
realty conveyances, including conveyances of completed houses.
15. At least thirty United States jurisdictions have adopted the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine, making it the majority rule. See Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491,495 (Iowa 1985) (lengthy,
although not exhaustive, list of jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine).
16. 76 Wn. 2d428, 457 P.2d 199(1969). In House, the court discussed the inequity associated with
imposing the loss resulting from a horribly defective new house upon its first purchaser and adopted the
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the doctrine's applicability to an apartment complex transaction, where the
parties dealt at arm's length, in Frickel v. Sunnyside Enterprises.17 In
House, Frickel, and Klos v. Gockel,18 the only cases in which the court has
addressed implied warranty of habitability issues, the court set specifically
defined limitations on the doctrine. Currently, implied warranties of habitability attach only to "commercial" sales of new dwellings' 9 to first
intended occupants. 20 A conveyance is "commercial" if a builder-vendor 2'
builds a dwelling with the purpose to sell, and the builder-vendor is in the
business of building such dwellings. 22 Additionally, builder-vendors are
liable under the doctrine only for those defects that render structures
uninhabitable. 23 Finally, courts in Washington have considered the significance of prepurchase buyer inspections and express contractual disclaimers. 24
II.

PUBLIC POLICIES SUPPORTING THE DOCTRINE

Two policy-based rationales support the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine. First, when an ordinary home purchaser reasonably relies on a
doctrine as an exception to caveat emptor. 76 Wn. 2d at 435-36, 457 P.2d at 203-04. The court in
House generally defined limitations on the doctrine's application, drawing restrictions wholesale from
both commentators and other jurisdictions. Id. at 436, 457 P.2d at 204. Interestingly, House v.
Thornton is the only case in which the court actually has imposed an implied warranty of habitability.
17. 106 Wn. 2d 714, 725 P.2d 422 (1986). In Frickel, the majority of the court refused, under the
facts of the case, to impose an implied warranty of habitability. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d at 426. The court
based its refusal on three grounds. First, the facts of that case did not meet the doctrine's existing
elements. Id. at 718-19,725 P.2d at 425. Second, the court was not persuaded that the doctrine should
be extended to transactions such as the arm's length one between the parties in the case. The court,
however, stopped short of declaring that the doctrine never applies to transactions between parties
dealing at arm's length. Id. at 719-20, 725 P.2d at 425-26; see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
Third, the presence of an express contractual disclaimer was significant to the court. Id. at 721, 725 P.2d
at 426; see infra note 118.
18. 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976). See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the "commercial sale" requirement imposed in Klos.
19. For a discussion of what constitutes a "dwelling" for purposes of the doctrine, see infra notes
49-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the doctrine's limitation to conveyances of residential
property, see infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
20. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 717-18, 725 P.2d at 424. For a discussion of the doctrine's limitation to
first purchasers or those in contract privity with builder-vendors, see infranotes 67-89 and accompanying text.
21. "Builder-vendors" are persons who buy lots and construct houses on them, speculating that
they will profit upon conveyance, as opposed to contractors hired by landowners to construct houses.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-03.
22. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 718, 725 P.2d at 424-25. For a discussion of the commercial sale
requirement, see infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
23. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 727, 725 P.2d at 429 (Pearson, L, dissenting). For a discussion of the
doctrinal requirement that the dwelling be uninhabitable, see infranotes 107-11 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inspection issue. See infra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disclaimer issue.
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builder-vendor's skill, public policy dictates that the builder-vendor assume the risk of defects which render a structure uninhabitable. 25 Second,
the doctrine theoretically results in improved overall housing quality, a
26
result that benefits the public.
A.

Reasonable Reliance

When addressing the "reasonable reliance" rationale, courts usually
focus on the relationship between builder-vendors and purchasers. 27 Caveat
emptor is premised on arm's length transactions between vendors and
purchasers.2 8 Arm's length transactions involve skilled and experienced
purchasers and vendors with roughly equal bargaining power. 29 Ordinary
purchasers of new homes today, however, generally do not deal at arm's
length with vendors. 30 As a result, court justifications for imposing implied
warranties of habitability are often based upon aspects of transactions
between ordinary home purchasers and sophisticated vendors.
Courts reason that purchasers not dealing at arm's length have limited
ability to negotiate risk assumption and therefore have limited means of
protecting themselves. 3 1 Their only realistic means of protection is to
ascertain whether houses are built soundly.32 Purchasers can conceivably
do this by inspecting dwellings themselves, 33 by hiring experts to inspect,
or by buying from professionals with good reputations for skill and integrity. The first two options are impractical because often in completed
houses structural defects are difficult even for experts to discover. 34 The
25. See infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
26. Since other building-quality assurance laws exist, the "'improving quality" rationale is not by
itself a strong justification for the doctrine. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. The rationale is
therefore treated throughout this Comment as having less analytical significance than the "reasonable
reliance" rationale.
27. See, e.g., Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill.
2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1979)
(implied warranties arise "because of the unusual dependent relationship of the vendee to the vendor").
28. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra
note 51 for a more complete discussion of what constitutes an "arm's length
transaction."
30. See, e.g., Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 719, 725 P.2d 422, 425 (1986), and
cases cited therein.
31. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965).
32. Comprehensive home owner insurance is also a means for home purchasers to protect
themselves; however, they may not perceive a need for insurance against structural defects. See infra
text accompanying notes 36-40.
33. In several jurisdictions purchasers are barred from recovering for defects which a reasonable
prepurchase inspection would have revealed. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
34. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (1979); see also
Bearman, supra note 3, at 545.
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only real choice, then, is to rely on builders to convey solid houses or not to
35
buy at all.
Courts have held that purchasers are justified in relying on the skill and
reputation of builder-vendors even when purchasers might have effectively
reduced risk by such means as insurance or expert inspection. 36 One
justification for purchaser reliance is that home purchasers generally have
consumer-type expectations and therefore are unaccustomed to acting in
caveat emptor controlled markets. 37 When consumers buy goods, the
goods have minimum implied warranties attached. Consumers therefore
38
develop expectations that they are assured of "getting what they pay for."
Given judicial and statutory consumer protection laws, home purchasers
believe that similar minimum guarantees exist when they purchase new
homes. 39 Since home purchasers have no intuitive bases for believing that
houses are treated differently from goods, courts recognize that purchaser
expectations have merit. Purchasers with these expectations will likely not
take risk-reducing steps beyond inspecting houses themselves and inquiring about the builders from whom they buy. Courts therefore grant that new
houses are substantially "consumer goods," albeit technically real estate,
40
and hold it unjust to impose caveat emptor on new home purchasers.
Builder-vendor conduct is also said to render purchaser reliance reasonable. Builder-vendors purposefully create expectations in purchasers that
they will receive not merely liveable but truly wonderful homes. 4 1 Courts
hold that such implicit representations in effect create contract rights. 42
To summarize, ordinary home purchasers are practically forced to rely
on the skill, knowledge, reputation, and integrity of builder-vendors. The
nature of new home transactions, and the relationships between the parties,
is such that reliance is reasonable, especially in light of expectations
created by legislatures, courts, and builder-vendors themselves. When
35. Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 389 N.E.2d at 1158; see also Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or.
635,525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (1974) (home purchasers are "forced" to rely upon builder-vendors' skill and
knowledge).
36. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
37. Bearman, supra note 3, at 549-52.
38. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing MerchantDid It, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 835, 835-36 (1967).
39. Bearman, supra note 3, at 541-42.
40. See, e.g., Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966) ("The old rule of caveat
emptor does not satisfy the demands of justice in such cases."); see also Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or.
635,525 P.2d 1019,1022 (1974); Padulav. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29,298 A.2d 529, 531

(1973).
41. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 725, 725 P.2d 422, 428 (1986) (Pearson, J.,
dissenting); Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tenn. 1982).
42. See, e.g., Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. 1981).
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purchasers purchase from builder-vendors in reasonable reliance, the implied warranty of habitability applies as a matter of public policy. 43
B.

Improving Construction Quality

As a second rationale for the implied warranty of habitability doctrine,
commentators argue that it improves the average quality of new houses on
the market by discouraging shoddy workmanship. 44 The doctrine probably
does have that effect, since it subjects builders to liability which can be
avoided by improving quality. Improvement in the quality of new homes,
although a positive result of the doctrine, is not of central importance.
Improvement in housing quality results from other factors, such as building
code requirements 45 and the need for builders to maintain good reputations
to sell homes.
III.

ANALYSIS

Because the implied warranty of habitability doctrine is a creature of
public policy, 46 policy should guide its application. Washington's formulation of the doctrine, however, is in many respects inconsistent with its
policy foundations. 47 The doctrine's existing limitations 48 need to be reexamined in light of competing policy concerns. Washington courts can
reformulate the doctrine to clarify its existing elements, making them more
consistent with the doctrine's policy. Such reformulation would provide a
logical, comprehensible, and consistent basis for enforcing implied warranties of habitability in the future.
A.

Type of Structure/Natureof Transaction

Washington courts have not expressly limited the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine to conveyances of houses, but that has been its
exclusive application to date. 49 As the Frickel majority hinted, and as
43.

Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 717, 725 P.2d at 424.

7S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926A, at 818 (3d ed. 1961); see also
Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 725, 725 P.2d at 428 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
45. Washington has a strict building code statute with the stated purpose of serving the policy.
44.

WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.020 (1985).

46. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 717, 719, 720, 725 P.2d 422, 424, 425, 426
(1986).
47. Justice Pearson, joined by Justices Dore and Callow, recognized the confusion and inconsistencies associated with the doctrine in his Frickel dissent. 106 Wn. 2d at 722-23, 725 P.2d at 427; see
infra note 61.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
49. In Allen v. Anderson, 16 Wn. App. 446, 447-48, 557 P.2d 24, 25-26 (1976), the court of
appeals stated in dictum that the doctrine applies to sales of apartment buildings, but refused to impose
an implied warranty on other grounds.
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developed below, the doctrine might properly apply to any residential
property conveyance5 0 where purchasers do not deal at arm's length. 51
When considering whether to extend the doctrine to other residential
property, courts ought to focus on whether the conveyance transaction
takes place at arm's length, and not on the type of residential building
involved.
1.

RelationshipBetween Parties

Distinguishing between transactions at arm's length and those not at
arm's length is consistent with the policy concerns behind the doctrine. The
"reasonable reliance" rationale5 2 does not justify applying implied warranties of habitability to arm's length conveyances, regardless of the type of
residential structure involved. First, arm's length transactors by definition
are notforced to rely on builder-vendor skill and reputation. Rather, they
have the ability to negotiate risk assumption, which might be done by
insisting on a price reduction or express warranties. Second, the expectations held by sophisticated arm's length parties are fundamentally different
from those held by consumer-type home purchasers. Home-purchaser
expectations theoretically have two sources: those created by the legal
system 53 and those created by builder-vendors. 54 Arm's length purchasers,
on the other hand, derive similar expectations from neither source. When
50. All the justices in Frickel agreed the doctrine might apply to such sales in proper circumstances. 106 Wn. 2d at 721, 723, 725 P.2d at 426-27. "Residential property" includes houses,
condominiums, apartment buildings, and any other structures built for the purpose of human habitation. Id.
51. An "arm's length transaction" is generally described as one between two parties with roughly
equal bargaining power and comparable skill and experience. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 719, 725 P.2d at
425 (1986).
The majority in Frickel identified four factors indicating equal bargaining power. One, where a
purchaser initiates the purchase of a building which the builder did not originally intend to sell; two,
where purchasers enter the transaction mainly to invest; three, where the subject of the transaction is
essentially a commercial enterprise; and four, where a tailored contract has been drafted by a lawyer. Id.
at 720, 725 P.2d at 425. Other factors not identified by the majority could include: Five, where the
parties actually negotiate risk of defects or such risk is a consideration in price; six, where reliance by
one party on the other's skill, integrity, or reputation is optional; and seven, where the purchaser does
not intend to reside in the structure. This list is not exhaustive, nor must all the factors be present before
it can be said the parties have roughly equal bargaining power.
"Comparable skill and experience" concerns the degree of sophistication each party has in the
particular type of transaction. Parties who personally lack sophistication may qualify as arm's length
transactors if represented by sophisticated agents. Id. at 720, 725 P.2d at 425. The Frickels, for
example, were represented by a lawyer and an experienced real estate agent. Id. Skilled and experienced
transactors are those who understand the procedures and risks involved in entering certain transactions.
52. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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arm's length parties transact in good faith and disclose all relevant facts of
which they have knowledge, caveat emptor traditionally applies. 55 Sophisticated arm's length purchasers presumably are aware of the rule and,
therefore, have no reasonable expectations of judicial protection. In addition, a party in an arm's length, non-fiduciary relationship has no reason to
rely on a party with whom he contracts beyond assuming good faith
56
disclosure of all relevant facts.
2.

Implied Warranties of Habitabilityin CommercialResidential
Property Sales

The court in Frickelexpressly left open the main issue with which it was
presented: whether the implied warranty of habitability doctrine ever
57
applies to conveyances of commercial residential property.
As a general rule, courts should not extend the implied warranty to
commercial residential property transactions. Courts should consider the
nature of the conveyance transaction, not the type of building involved, to
be the dispositive factor when determining whether to apply the doctrine.
Conveyances of commercial residential property, such as apartment
buildings, are normally "business transactions." Participants in business
transactions generally deal at arm's length. 58 The rule of caveat emptor
presupposes arm's length transactions. The implied warranty of habitability doctrine is an exception to caveat emptor created to accommodate
59
home purchasers who cannot deal at arm's length with builder-vendors.
Since most commercial residential property conveyances occur at arm's
length, implied warranties of habitability would generally not apply.60
The majority in Frickelfollowed this line of analysis. The court held that
the Frickels, unlike ordinary purchasers of new homes, were arm's length
transactors able to protect themselves. The doctrine, therefore, did not
61
apply to their purchase of an apartment complex.
55. Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wn. 2d 881, 892, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176-77 (1980).
56. Liebergesell, 93 Wn. 2d at 889, 613 P.2d at 1175. Conscious failure to disclose material facts,
however, may constitute fraud, rendering a transaction voidable. Id.
57. The court in Frickelstated, "We do not hold that an implied warranty of habitability can never
attach to the sale of an apartment complex. Rather we hold that such warranty does not exist under the
facts of this case." 106 Wn. 2d at 714, 725 P.2d at 426. "Commercial residential property" for the
purposes of this Comment includes any structure used by its owner at least in part for renting to tenants
for income production.
58. Liebergesell, 93 Wn. 2d at 889, 613 P.2d at 1175 (1980).
59. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 719, 725 P.2d at 425.
60. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66 for a discussion of commercial residential property
conveyances to purchasers not dealing at arm's length.
61. Frickel, 106 Wn. 2d at 719-20, 725 P.2d at 425-26. Justice Pearson and two other justices
dissented in Frickel, arguing that the implied warranty of habitability doctrine should be modified
because the existing elements ofthe doctrine are supported, ifat all, by only a questionable rationale. Id. at
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Under the proposed general rule, implied warranties of habitability
would not apply to commercial residential property conveyances. Protecting purchasers of commercial residential property who do not deal at arm's
length and have justifiable consumer-type expectations, 62 however, would
722-23,725 P.2d at 427. In particular, Justice Pearson would apply the warranty of habitability "to the
sale ofanyresidential structure constructed and soldby aprofessional builder. "Id. at723,725 P.2dat427
(emphasis in original). His proposed changes and the changes proposed in this Comment differ in major
respects, however. Also, it should be noted thatthe dissent's characterizationofthe majority opinion is not
entirely accurate. The dissent stated that the majority imposed two new limitations on the doctrine:
recovery is barred to purchasers who, first, seek a commercial investment, and second, fail to have an
expert inspect for possible defects prior to purchase. Id. at 722, 725 P.2d at 426. The majority, however,
did not go that far. Farst, the majority expressly left open the possibility that the doctrine might in proper
cases protect commercial investors, for it stated that the doctrine might attach to a sale of an apartment
complex. Id. at 721,725 P.2d at 426. Second, the majority merely indicated that a prepurchase expert
inspection is one way in which an arm's length transactor might protect himself against risk, but the court
did not state that failure to inspect in all cases bars recovery. Id. at 720,725 P.2d at 425.
TheFrickelmajority's analysis was similar to one undertaken in Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill.App. 3d
260,427 N.E.2d 1337 (1981), where a rental duplex owner sought recovery under the doctrine. The court
there persuasively distinguished between ordinary home purchasers and purchasers seeking incomeproducing property:
The motivations upon those seeking income-producingproperty, as well as thepressures upon them,
are considerably different from those of the [ordinary home purchaser]. The income-seeker,
whetherhe be purchasing common stocks, chattels, real estate, orany otherformof investment, has
ample opportunity to investigate, study, appraise and assess the relative merits and demerits of the
subject matter and then to make a calculated judgment as to how profitable it will be. In contrast, the
[ordinary home purchaser]is seeking shelter for himself and his family, oftentimes under considerable pressure brought about by job transfer, increase in family. . . or other factors over which he has
no control. If the [doctrine of implied] warranty is to be extended to an investor in real estate, by
extension of logic the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange should warrant that no
common stock traded there will ever decrease in value. The relaxation of the rules of caveat emptor
and merger by the supreme court was intended to protect a consumer, not an investor.
Id. at 1339.
Apparently theFrickelmajority read and was somewhat persuaded byHopkins. Bothcourts quoted the
sameparagraph fromPetersenv. Hubschman Constr. Co., 76111.2d31, 389N.E.2d 1154,1158 (1979), to
describe those purchasers the doctrine is intended to protect. Both courts held that the respective
purchasers were not within the class of persons protected by the doctrine. The only difference is that the
court in Frickelimplied it was possible that investors might be protected under the right circumstances,
106 Wn. 2d at 721, 725 P.2d at 426, while the Hopkins court would deny investors protection under any
circumstances.
Few other courts have been presented with the issue whether implied warranties attach to commercial
residential property. See, e.g., Hays v. Gilliam, 655 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) ("purchaserof an apartment houseis nota 'naivehomepurchaser,' but an investorin acommercialenterprise,"
and therefore no exceptionto caveatemptorapplies). Butsee Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d
88,91,12 Cal. 3d 374,115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (court imposed implied warranty in favorofpurchaserof
five apartment buildings, stating that since generally residential purchasers are unsophisticated and
reasonably rely on builder-vendors' skill, all builders and vendors of new construction should be held
implicitly to warrant reasonable quality); Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549,403 A.2d 942, 943-45
(1979) (courtheld thatpurchasers ofcommercialresidential propertyreasonably relied on builder-vendor
and were protected by implied warranty, even though they negotiated for an express warranty and were
seemingly at arm's length).
62. Where purchasers havejustifiable consumer-typeexpectations, the "reasonablereliance" policy
supports imposition of implied warranties in their favor. See supra notes 36-42 for a discussion of what

Washington Law Review

Vol 62:743, 1987

be consistent with the policy concerns behind the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine, assuming all its other requirements are met.
An instance where commercial residential property purchasers may have
reasonable consumer-type expectations is when they purchase primarily to
provide shelter for themselves. InAllen v. Anderson,63 forexample, potential
tenants of a new four-unit apartment building decided to buy and live in the
building rather than to rent. The Washington Court of Appeals stated in
dictum that the implied warranty of habitability doctrine could apply to an
apartment building conveyance, but declined to impose an implied warranty
on other grounds. 64 The court did not discuss whether the transaction there
was at arm's length, but it likely was not. Because the Aliens resided in the
building, they were both "consumers" and income-seekers. 65 If they were
primarily "consumers," then the Allens arguably had justifiable consumertype expectations. The opposite would have been true if their primary purpose was investment, regardless of whether they dealt at arm's length. 66
Courts objectively should view circumstances such as those present in
Allen to determine purchasers' primary purposes. A commercial residential property purchaser not dealing at arm's length would be eligible for
implied warranty protection if his primary purpose was to obtain shelter
rather than income.

3.

Conclusion

The implied warranty of habitability doctrine has no proper application
to transactions between parties dealing at arm's length. Purchasers of
commercial residential property who do not deal at arm's length should be
eligible for judicial protection only if shelter is their primary reason for the
purchase, with income production a secondary objective.
constitutes "justifiable consumer-type reliance."
63. 16 Wn. App. 446, 557 P.2d 24 (1976).
64. Id. at 447-48,557 P.2d at 25-26.
65. A commercial residential property owner is a "consumer," for the purposes of this analysis, if
the property serves mainly as the owner's residence, with income-production as a secondary purpose of
ownership. Though a person who rents out one room in a house owns commercial residential property if
such property is defined broadly, no significant basis exists for doctrinal purposes for distinguishing
between such an owner and an owner who rents no rooms. The former is arguably as much a
"consumer" as the latter. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. Under the definition
suggested, a duplex owner who lives in one unit and rents out the other would be a "consumer." As the
number of units in the building at issue increases, the likelihood increases that the property serves
primarily as a source of income. No set bright line for distinction can be drawn, but the primary purpose
of any particular party should be fairly apparent, on a case-by-case basis.
66. See supra note 61.
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B.

Validity of Existing Elements

1.

Privity

Currently, the Washington implied warranty of habitability doctrine
applies only if a conveyance is "fairly contemporaneous with completion
and not interrupted by an intervening tenancy unless the builder-vendor
created such an intervening tenancy for the primary purpose of promoting
the sale of the property." 67
This requirement arguably limits protection to those purchasers in contractual privity with builder-vendors, disallowing protection to purchasers
subsequent to the first. 68 The potential liability of builder-vendors is further
limited by a statute of repose, under which builder-vendors are liable only
for defects manifesting themselves within six years after substantial com-

pletion of construction. 69
a. Consistency with Underlying Policies
The privity requirement is consistent with the "reasonable reliance"
rationale. Although probably as unsophisticated as original purchasers,
67. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 571, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1976) (citing Casavant v.
Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24,327 A.2d 831 (1974) (When intervening renters who had intended to purchase
a new house failed to obtain financing, the builder sold the defective house to the plaintiffs, who
recovered on an implied warranty theory)).
68. In Klos, the court stated that the implied warranty extends to the initialvendee. 87 Wn. 2d at
570, 554 P.2d at 1352. This Comment is written on the assumption that privity is required.
At least one commentator, however, has argued that privity is not required in Washington. Comment,
Washington'sNewHome Implied WarrantyofHabitability-ExplanationandModel Statute, 54 WAsH.
L. R .185,199-200 (1978). That argument was based primarily on Gay v. Cornwall, 6Wn.App. 595,
494 P.2d 1371 (1972). Gay, however, was arguably decided on the wrong theory of law. In Gay,a lot
owner, 0, hired a builder to construct a house. Before completion 0 sold the property to C, who before
completion sold to G. G, the first occupant, sued the builder when the house's defects appeared. The
court of appeals found for G on an implied warranty of habitability theory, holding privity of contract
between G and the builder was unnecessary. The court's choice of theory was misplaced, although the
result was correct. The builder was not a builder-vendor but a contractor, and therefore the doctrine did
not apply to him. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. The result was correct, however,
because G had effectively been assigned the contract rights. See Robbins v. Hunts Food & Indus., 64
Wn. 2d 289, 391 P.2d 713 (1964). Thus, G could have recovered on a failure of substantial performance
theory. See Hoye v. Century Builders, 52 Wn. 2d 830, 835, 329 P.2d 474,477 (1958). In other words,
the contract was for construction rather than conveyance; privity in the construction contract actually
existed between G and the builder, and the builderbreached the contract when he failed to construct a
habitable house. Caveat emptor did not apply, so application of its implied warranty exception was
misplaced. See supra text accompanying note 14.
The privity requirement arguably does not automatically preclude a person buying a used dwelling
directly from a builder-vendor from seeking warranty protection. See Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567,
554 P.2d 1349 (1976). As long as the purchaser reasonably relies on the builder-vendor's expertise,
imposition of an implied warranty of habitability is consistent with public policy. See infra text
accompanying note 93. No privity constraints prevent such a result.
69. WASH. Ry. CODE § 4.16.310 (1986).
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subsequent purchasers normally exercise roughly equal bargaining power
when they buy from original purchasers. 70 Nevertheless, some subsequent
purchasers might forego risk negotiations and actually rely on buildervendor skill. Implied warranties, however, can only apply to subsequent
conveyances if purchaser reliance is reasonable. 7 1 Reliance is reasonable
only if subsequent purchasers have justifiable expectations that risk negotiations are unnecessary. The justifiable expectations held by original
purchasers have two sources: the "holding out" of expertise by buildervendors, and the judicial and statutory protection of consumers. 72 Subsequent purchasers are unable to derive similar expectations from either
source. Although some courts have asserted that a builder "holds out" his
expertise even to subsequent purchasers who do not know him, 73 any such
expectations created by a builder-vendor are at best tenuous. 74 Moreover,
courts in consumer transaction cases still require contractual privity in
actions on implied warranty theories. 75 Subsequent purchasers therefore
cannot claim to derive expectations of implied minimum guarantees from
courts. Policy does not require protection for subsequent purchasers who
have no justifiable bases for relying and who can protect themselves by
negotiating risk.
The privity requirement is not inconsistent with the "improving quality"
rationale. 76 Since new home purchasers, on average, live in their houses
longer than the six-year builder-vendor liability period, builder-vendors
are, more often than not, liable for defects discovered within that period.
Moreover, building code requirements effectively encourage quality work
by builders. 77 Therefore, the privity requirement does not lessen effective
deterrence to shoddy construction.
b.

Barriers to Abandonment

Although policy concerns behind the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine do not dictate abandoning the privity requirement, some might
70. In other words, transactions between original and subsequent purchasers are likely "arm's
length," because they occur between "parties with roughly equal bargaining power and comparable
skill and experience." Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 719, 725 P.2d 422, 425 (1986)
(emphasis added); see supra note 51.
71. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
72. Id.
73. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395,271 S.E.2d 768,769 (1980); Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 I11.
2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1982).
74. Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1976) (DeBruler, J.,
dissenting).
75. Baughn v. Honda Motor Co., 107 Wn. 2d 127, 151, 727 P.2d 655, 668-69 (1986).
76. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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argue that the requirement is arbitrary and should be abandoned, especially
in light of the statutory six-year liability period. 78 Policy-based limitations
in contract and tort law, however, would impede abandonment. Courts7 9can
remove the privity requirement only if they ignore those limitations.
The implied warranty of habitability doctrine is essentially a contract
theory.8 0 Liability arises on breach of a contract-based duty to convey a
habitable house. Under traditional contract law, privity is a requisite for
protection against breach of warranty or contract. 8 1 Exceptions exist if
persons are intended third-party beneficiaries of contracts 82 or if their
claims essentially sound in tort. 83 Since neither exception applies in implied warranty of habitability cases, 84 well-established contract law denies
subsequent purchasers implied warranty of habitability protection.
If the contract privity requirement were abandoned, builder-vendors
could only be liable to subsequent purchasers for breach of tort-based
duties. Recovery by subsequent purchasers under the doctrine would,
however, be inconsistent with tort law principles and policy-based limita-

tions on liability.85
Holding builder-vendors liable to subsequent purchasers in tort for
negligently caused defects would not violate limitations on established
Washington tort law, but implied warranty concepts are not involved when
liability is based on negligence. 86 Absent negligence, using the doctrine to
78. See, e.g., Frickel v. Surmyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714,729-30, 725 P.2d 422, 430-31 (1986)
(Pearson, J., dissenting) (addressing WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.16.310 (1986)).
79. See infra notes 80-89.
80. The court inFrickelspoke of the doctrine exclusively in contract terms, using such language as
"guarantee," "promise," and "receive that for which he has bargained." 106 Wn. 2d at 716, 717,719,
725 P.2d at 424-25; see also Comment, supra note 68, at 200 n.76.
81. Daughtry v. Jet Aeration, 91 Wn. 2d 704, 711, 592 P.2d 631, 634 (1979).
82. Lidstrand v. Silvercrest Indus., 28 Wn. App. 359,362-63,623 P.2d 710,713 (1981). Buildervendors in implied warranty of habitability cases do not intend to givefirst purchasers warranties, let
alone subsequent purchasers. Therefore, the third party beneficiary exception is unlikely to apply in
implied warranty of habitability cases.
83. Daughtry,91 Wn. 2d at 711,592 P.2d at 634. Implied warranty of habitability cases do not fall
within the class of contract cases sounding in tort. That class includes "cases of noxious or dangerous
products, fraud or deceit in the sale of a product, and negligence in the sale or construction of a product
not otherwise dangerous." Id. The assumption in implied warranty of habitability is that defects are not
negligently caused. See infra note 86. The exception to the privity requirement for contract cases
sounding in tort appears to be outmoded, given the Tort Reform Act, WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72 (1981),
which likely obviates resort to the exception as a recovery theory. The Tort Reform Act holds
manufacturers liable regardless of contract privity where causes of action sound essentially in tort.
WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72.030 (1982). The Act apparently replaced the existing "contract-sounding-intort" rule. Id. § 7.72.020.
84. See supra notes 82-83.
85. This statement is made within the context of this Comment, which is limited in scope to
discussion of the doctrine's application where the only damage is to a defective structure itself. See
supra note 2.
86. Negligence principles are not affected by operation of the doctrine, for implied warranty
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protect subsequent purchasers actually would entail holding buildervendors strictly liable in tort. 87 Strict liability recovery is not available
when the only damage is to the defective product itself, however; personal
injury or damage to other property inhere as limitations. 88 Granting recovery for structural defects affecting only a house itself, then, would be
inconsistent with strict liability concepts. 89
2.

Commercial Sale

For an implied warranty of habitability to apply, a conveyance must be
"commercial rather than casual or personal in nature. ' 9° The court in
Frickel v. Sunnyside Enterprises construed the requirement to have four
components, all of which must be present. 9 1 The new dwelling must be
built, one, for purposes of sale; two, by a builder-vendor; three, in the
theories apply in Washington only if defects are not caused by builder negligence. Berg v. General
Motors, 87 Wn. 2d 584, 594, 555 P.2d 818, 823 (1976) (manufacturer of boat motor liable for lost
profits resulting from negligently caused qualitative defects, even though lack of contract privity
prevented recovery on an implied warranty theory). Builders in Washington may be liable for negligently caused defects regardless of implied warranty considerations, even if those defects are merely
qualitative and cause no injury to person or property other than the structures themselves. Id. In such
cases, foreseeability is the only limitation; privity is irrelevant. Id. It should be noted that Washington is
in the distinct minority ofjurisdictions allowing recovery for negligence causing purely economic loss,
and it is questionable whether that practice is valid in light of policy considerations. See Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450-53 (1982) (lists majority and minority
jurisdictions; contains an excellent discussion of the policy reasons for the distinction). Nevertheless,
where defects are negligently caused, no implied warranty of habitability issue arises under Washington
law.
87. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 I11.
2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324, 331-32 (1982) (Ryan, C.J.,
dissenting) (affording recovery without privity in defective house cases is equivalent to holding buildervendors strictly liable in tort; it is a "fiction" to call the doctrine "implied warranty" if privity is not
required). A builder-vendor would be subject to strict tort liability because liability would attach
regardless of negligence and regardless of contractual privity. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
88. Berg v. General Motors, 87 Wn. 2d 584, 594, 555 P.2d 818, 823 (1976) (dictum); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443, 445-50 (1982) (excellent discussion of
the policy reasons for the distinction). But see Redarowicz, 92 11. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (majority of
the Illinois court ignored the distinction and abandoned the privity requirement with respect to the
implied warranty of habitability doctrine). A well-reasoned dissent to Redarowicz, however, raised
strict liability policy concerns and powerfully rebutted the majority opinion. Id. at 331-32; see also
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 611,621-22 (1976) (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
89. Furthermore, most builder-vendors are probably not subject to strict liability in tort, for the Tort
Reform Act applies only to those builder-vendors "engaged in the mass production and sale of
standardized dwellings." WASH. R~v. CODE § 7.72.010(l)(a) (1981).
Regardless of policy constraints, courts in a few jurisdictions have abandoned privity requirements in
the implied warranty of habitability context. See, e.g., Redarowicz, 92 I11.
2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324;
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976); Elden v. Simmons 631 P.2d 739
(Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Moxly v. Laramie Builders,
Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
90. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 570, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1976).
91. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 718, 725 P.2d 422, 424-25 (1986).
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business of building; four, such dwellings. 92 Public policy justifies applying the doctrine only in cases where purchasers reasonably rely on the skill,
reputation, or integrity of builder-vendors. 93 The purpose of the commercial sale requirement apparently is to assure that courts will invoke implied
warranties only in cases of reasonable reliance. As now construed, however, the requirement is in several respects potentially under-inclusive.
a. Built for Purposes of Sale
Under the Frickel construction, the implied warranty of habitability
doctrine does not apply to a conveyance if the builder did not originally
intend to sell a dwelling, regardless of whether all the other limiting criteria
are met. 94 Neither public policy concerns nor the cases the court cites
support that construction.
A builder's original intent to sell or personally to dwell in a building does
not determine the reasonableness of a purchaser's reliance; a purchaser
might reasonably rely regardless of such intent. Indeed, if a purchaser
knows a builder built not for conveyance but for personal use, the purchaser
may actually have added assurance that the structure is sound. After all,
what builder wants to live in a shoddy house?95 Reliance is also reasonable
if a purchaser is aware that a builder built with intent to sell, since the
purchaser knows the sale is "commercial." As long as the purchaser knows
the builder is a skilled professional of good repute, reliance is reasonable
notwithstanding knowledge about original intent. In light of the doctrine's
policy bases, 96 intent to sell is not an appropriate prerequisite to recovery
under an implied warranty theory.
The court in Frickel construed Klos v. Gocke197 automatically to bar
application of the doctrine if a builder does not build for purposes of sale.
Reexamination of Klos is advisable, however. Klos arguably stands for the
proposition that a conveyance is "commercial" if the purchaser reasonably
believes it is, whether or not the builder so intended. 98
92. Id. at 718, 730-31,725 P.2d at 424-25, 431.
93. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of what constitutes reasonable
reliance in this context.
94. Id.
95. See Hopkins v. Hartman, 101 Ill. App. 3d 260, 427 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (1981).
96. See supra notes 25-45 and accompanying text.

97. 87 Wn. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
98. In Klos, the purchaser knew the builder-vendor had lived in the house for almost a year prior to
conveyance, and it was not objectively clear whether she had built intending to sell. The court stated that
the builder-vendor's conduct did not allow the purchasers reasonably to believe the sale was commercial, holding the sale was therefore not commercial. 87 Wn. 2d at 570, 571,554 P.2d at 1352. Arguably,
however, the builder-vendor did in fact build intending to sell, as the house was one ofseveral the builder
had sold, presumably for profit. Justice Pearson recognized this in his Frickeldissent. 106 Wn. 2d at
731-32, 725 P.2d at 431 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
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In addition, none of the other cases cited by the court in Frickel
persuasively support the intent to sell requirement. 99 At least one jurisdiction has specifically held that a builder's original intent to build for personal
use does not bar application of the doctrine. 100 To hold otherwise would
provide builders an easily feigned defense, and would thwart the policy
objective of deterring unscrupulous or unskilled builders. 101
b.

Builder-Vendor

The implied warranty of habitability doctrine only applies to dwellings
built by builder-vendors. This limitation is consistent with the purpose of
the doctrine. Builder-vendors are those parties in the business of building
and marketing houses, as compared to builders who contract with individuals to construct homes for them specifically. The latter type have traditionally been liable to home owners for defects under pure contract
theory, 10 2 while caveat emptor applied to conveyances by buildervendors. 103 Since the implied warranty of habitability doctrine arose solely
to resolve problems associated with conveyances by builder-vendors, and
since the doctrine is not needed to remedy defects in structures built by
individual contractors, the limitation is appropriate.
c.

In Business of Building

Purchasers are prevented from recovering against any builder-vendors
except those regularly engaged in building-i.e., "professionals."1 04 The
Washington court has interpreted this element as an absolute prerequisite to
implied warranty protection. Whether a builder builds regularly, however,
should merely serve as one of several indicia to determine the reasonableness of purchaser reliance. A purchaser might reasonably but incorrectly believe a builder is regularly engaged in building. Or the purchaser
99. See, e.g., Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985) (the court stated that construction for
purpose of sale is an element of the warranty, but did not explain why, other than stating that such an
element is "generally recognized"); Dixon v. Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1982)
(court merely required that the vendor be in the business of building dwellings of the type at issue, not
that the particular dwelling was built for sale); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467,346 A.2d 210 (1975) (the
court stated that building for purpose of resale was one indication that the sale was commercial, but
expressly left open the question whether a builder's original intent not to sell prevents the sale from
being commercial).
100. Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 1981).
101. Id. In other words, the requirement is also inconsistent with the "improving quality" policy.
See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
102. When a contractor builds an unusable dwelling, the contract could probably be rescinded on a
"failure of substantial performance" theory. See supra note 14.
103. Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Iowa 1985).
104. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wn. 2d 567, 570, 554 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1976).
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might have good reason to believe the builder-vendor is skilled even though
not regularly engaged in the business. In either case, the purchaser might
reasonably rely on the builder's skill. 105
The refusal by Washington courts to apply the doctrine to non-professional builders also undermines the "improving quality" policy.1 06 Because such builders may not be held liable for defects in their buildings,
they may not be effectively deterred from building inferior dwellings and
then placing them on the market.
d.

Such Dwellings

A home purchaser cannot recover from a builder if the builder does not
normally build houses. The requirement would protect both builders of the
Seattle Kingdome and builders of chicken coops who do not normally build
houses from suit under the doctrine by purchasers of defective houses. The
flaws inherent in the "business of building" requirement apply here as well.
The reasonableness of a purchaser's reliance might depend on knowledge
of the builder-vendor's business-specifically, the types of buildings the
purchaser knows the builder normally builds. If such knowledge is present,
however, it should be only one of several indicia of reasonableness.
Uninhabitability

3.

In House v. Thornton the court stated that a structure is uninhabitable
when it is unsafe for occupancy and unfit for its intended purpose. 10 7 The
warranty applies to buildings rendered uninhabitable by either structural or
foundational defects. 108 Builders are not required to build "perfect" dwellings, but merely reasonably habitable ones. 109
Justice Pearson noted in his Frickel dissent that a purchaser is not
required actually to move out of his house to prove lack of reasonable
105. It should be noted that in most cases purchasers would not be reasonable in relying on the skill
of a nonprofessional. Also, home purchasers are likely to deal at arm's length with nonprofessionals, so
implied warranties would not apply against nonprofessionals anyway. See supra notes 52-61 and
accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
107. The test of uninhabitability was stated as follows:
When the foundation of a house cracks, slips, shifts or deteriorates to such an extent that a person
of reasonable prudence would reasonably assume that the house is unsafe for occupancy, it is no
longer fit for its intended purpose, i.e., a place of residence for the owner and his family.
House v, Thornton, 76 Wn. 2d 428, 435,457 P.2d 199,203 (1969). A reasonably habitable house is not
only reasonably safe, but also reasonably comfortable. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 196,484 P.2d

380, 386 (1971) (dictum).
108.
109.

House, 76 Wn. 2d at 436, 457 P.2d at 204.
Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529, 532 (1973).
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habitability. 110 Failure to move out, however, does constitute evidence of
habitability. III So construed, the "habitability" requirement is consistent
with the policies supporting the doctrine. The doctrine's goal is to assure
first purchasers that they will be able to live in the homes conveyed to them
by builder-vendors.
C.

Validity of Other DoctrinalLimits

1.

PrepurchaseInspection

a. PurchaserNot at Arm's Length
Although purchasers are not required to commission expert inspections
prior to purchase in order to avail themselves of implied warranty protection, some courts have held that implied warranties are effectively waived
in cases where purchasers would have discovered potential defects had they
conducted reasonable prepurchase inspections. 112 Such inspections are not
required to be more than cursory."1 3 This inspection requirement is compatible with the reasonable reliance rationale. When a purchaser fails to
inspect for obvious defects prior to purchase, any reliance on buildervendor skill is unreasonable. No builder can be said to warrant implicitly
that a structure is free from defects when even an untrained eye can see the
defects. Therefore, it is reasonable to require purchasers to make limited
pre-purchase inspections in order to seek protection under the doctrine. 114
b.

Arm's Length Transactions

Whether defects are discoverable prior to purchase is irrelevant to the
question whether policy concerns call for protection of arm's length purchasers via the implied warranty of habitability doctrine. Arm's length
transactors presumably are aware that the buildings they negotiate to buy
may be defective, and can take several routes to protect themselves against
the perceived risk. One route is to commission an expert inspection of the
structure to search for potential defects, and if any are discovered to act
110. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 732-33, 725 P.2d 422, 432 (1986).
111. Id.
112. Tyus v. Resta, 32 Pa. Super. 11, 476 A.2d 427, 432 (1984) (discussing Pennsylvania's and
other jurisdictions' prepurchase inspection requirements).
113. Id.
114. A Washington court has indicated that some pre-purchase inspection is required, although the
court's statement was made outside the implied warranty context. Davey v. Brownson, 3 Wn. App. 820,
825, 478 P.2d 258, 261 (1970) (layman purchaser is bound by facts which a reasonable investigation
would normally disclose). A builder-vendor's failure to disclose the existence of known defects not
discoverable by reasonable inspection may give rise to a cause of action for misrepresentation. See
Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wn. 2d 881, 892-93, 613 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1980).
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accordingly. It is often the case, though, that even experts cannot discover
structural defects in completed buildings. 115 Arm's length transactors
presumably realize this fact, and know that other risk compensation routes
are available. 116 The point is that arm's length purchasers are able to protect
themselves regardless of inspections; therefore implied warranties of habitability ought never to apply to them. 117
2.

Disclaimersof Warranty

Implied warranties can apply only in the absence of valid contractual risk
assignments. If a vendor expressly disclaims any warranty, and the contract
is not induced by fraud, no warranty can be implied by law. 118 In the face of
a valid disclaimer of warranty clause, then, no implied warranty of habitability issue arises. 119 Since the doctrine is based on reasonable purchaser

reliance, it clearly does not apply where purchasers forthrightly agree not
to rely. 120

115. Frickel v. Sunnyside Enters., 106 Wn. 2d 714, 728-29, 725 P.2d 422, 430 (1986).
116. For example, arm's length purchasers could negotiate for a price reduction or an express
warranty, or they could purchase insurance.
117. InFrickel, then, the fact the Frickels could have discovered defects prior to purchase was not
vital to the court's holding.
118. Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 195,484 P.2d 380,385 (1971); see also Dixon v. Mountain
City Constr., 632 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. 1982).
The court in Frickel briefly addressed the issue of disclaimer validity with respect to the implied
warranty of habitability doctrine, finding the disclaimer in that case valid. 106 Wn. 2d at 720-21, 725
P.2d 426. The Frickelcourt relied on the rule regarding disclaimer validity set forth in Berg, 79 Wn. 2d
at 196, 484 P.2d at 386. In Berg the court stated: "Waivers of such warranties, being disfavored in law,
are ineffectual unless explicitly negotiated between buyer and seller and set forth with particularity
showing the particular qualities and characteristics of fitness which are being waived." 79 Wn. 2d at
196, 484 P.2d at 386.
Justice Pearson, in his Frickel dissent, argued that to be valid a disclaimer must be written,
conspicuous, explicitly negotiated, and include the word "habitability." 106 Wn. 2d at 737,725 P.2d at
434 (Pearson, J., dissenting). While his proposed rule is consistent with Berg and would have merit in a
consumer-type transaction, it would not have merit in all cases. The rule would prevent arm's length
parties, bargaining in good faith, from placing risk of defects on a purchaser, no matter how clearly the
parties express their intent, unless their written contract contains the word "habitability." Such a result
would contravene basic notions of bargaining and risk assumption. See Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wn.
2d 881, 889-93, 613 P.2d 1170, 1175-77 (1980) (discussion of "freedom of contract" between arm's
length parties in a caveat emptor environment); see also Berg, 79 Wn. 2d at 196-97, 484 P.2d at 387
(Neill, J., concurring).
119. Since the court found the disclaimer clauses valid in Frickel, the court's discussion of the
implied warranty issue was unnecessary. However, the disclaimer issue was not raised at trial. 106 Wn.
2d at 715, 725 P.2d at 423. Therefore, possibly the record on that issue was not developed to the extent
necessary to dispose of the appeal on that ground. It is not uncommon for courts to overlook
disclaimers. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942, 943, 945 (1979)
(explicitly negotiated warranty ignored; implied warranty imposed).
120. The rule enunciated in Berg clearly reflects the court's perception of public policy on the
disclaimer validity issue. 79 Wn. 2d at 196, 484 P.2d at 385. This Comment focuses on doctrinal
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CONCLUSION

Policy concerns dictate that Washington should reformulate its implied
warranty of habitability doctrine. The doctrine should not be limited to
conveyances of houses but should include commercial residential property
conveyances where purchasers do not deal at arm's length and buy primarily for their own shelter. The doctrine should never apply to transactions between parties dealing at arm's length. The doctrine should apply
only to conveyances where builder-vendors and purchasers transact
directly. Protection should not, however, be limited to conveyances of
brand new buildings. The commercial sale requirement should be construed to include purchasers who reasonably believe they can rely upon a
builder's expertise. The defects complained of must be of the type that has
rendered or will render the structure uninhabitable. Finally, the purchaser
must not have been able to discover the defects by a reasonable prepurchase
inspection.
Joseph C. Brown, Jr.

consistency with public policy, and since the Berg rule is definitely consistent with public policy further
discussion of disclaimer validity here is unnecessary.

